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Status Offenders Should Be Removed
From the Juvenile Court*
LUKE QUINN**
PETER M. HUTCHISON***
Inadequate financial resources and overcrowded juvenile placement fa-
cilities have frequently been cited as grounds for the abrogation of the ju-
venile court's practice of retaining jurisdiction over status offenders. In
this article, Judge Quinn suggests the existence of even more compelling
reasons which support diversion of status offenders to programs better
suited to their particular needs. The author contends that the juvenile
court's jurisdiction should be confined to matters offact-finding and adju-
dication, rather than intruding into areas within the domain of the par-
ents, and into areas in which the court lacks the necessary expertise. It is
argued that diversion of status offenders would also eliminate the trau-
matic experience of courtroom appearances and the frequently unneces-
sary period of incarceration. Abrogation of jurisdiction would enable the
court to. devote its energies and resources to its primary concerns of abuse
and juvenile crime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year hundreds of thousands of children run away from
home' and as many as two million skip school regularly.2 Such
* The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Gerald Thalham-
mer in the preparation of this article.
** B.A., Western Kentucky State University; J.D., Wayne State University;
Assistant Attorney General, Michigan 1964-66; Genesee County District Judge,
1968-70; Genesee County Probate Judge 1970 - present.
*** B.S., Michigan State University, 1973.
1. INGRAM, THE INNOCENT CRIMINA-LEADERS GUIDE 28 (1977).
2. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1979, at 44, for a discussion of the truancy problem.
children are labeled status offenders and, as a group, account for
approximately fifty per cent (50%) of the case load of the juvenile
courts in this country.3 Many of these children will be adjudi-
cated delinquents, and a great number will be sent to the same
institutions as serious felony offenders.4 In fact, a status offender
is nearly as likely to be institutionalized as other adult criminals,5
and may be placed in an adult jail.6 Institutionalization is done
under the guise of "helping" these children, but the evidence is
strong that such "help" often violates the children's right to due
process and frequently takes the form of abusive and brutalizing
treatment.7 Based on this harsh treatment and the belief that ju-
venile courts, at best, can do little to aid these troubled children,
there is a growing movement to abolish jurisdiction over
juveniles.
Naturally, this sentiment is creating much opposition, espe-
cially from those entrenched within the juvenile justice system.
Some claim that such a move would be tantamount to abandoning
the children most deserving of help 8 and that the court may be
the only entity to help these youngsters. Others claim that the
act would destroy the American family and that it would amount
to a consent for children to leave home and quit school in droves.
Others feel that the courts can provide help better than anyone
else.9
There are some judges who apparently believe that certain chil-
3. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 312 (1978).
4. Id. at 20. See also National Council of Jewish Women, Symposium on Sta-
tus Offenders: Manualfor Action 10 (1977), wherein Milton Rector states:
We think about 600,000 to one million children are detained every year.
And about a third of those, the sampling data would indicate, are non-de-
linquent children, status offenders. Of the youngsters committed to cor-
rectional institutions or residential care, about a fourth of the boys are
status offenders, and about 70% of the girls are status offenders... we
should ask why they often stay longer both in detention and in commit-
ment institutions than those who have committed what would be major
felonies if adults.
5. Id. at 335. See also Serrin, Status Offenses, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 9, 1975.
A senior attorney for Michigan Legal Services related the story of two youngsters
he represented the same day, one who was a boy charged with first degree mur-
der. Because he had an aunt who would take custody of him, he spent less than
ten minutes in detention. The second youngster was a girl who, after being beaten
by her stepfather had run away. Because her parents did not want her, she spent
5 months in a youth home.
6. INGRAM, supra note 1, at 27. "18 percent of the children incarcerated in
adult jails are status offenders."
7. See SILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 312. See also WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE
PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S INCARCERATED CHILDREN 106 (1976).
8. Arthur, Status Offenders Need A Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L. REV. 632
(1977).
9. Change within the Criminal Justice System has always been slow and
painful and judges traditionally have been a cautious lot. For an interesting ac-
count of the debate in 19th century England on removing the death penalty for
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dren will benefit from detention.'0 A recent article claimed that
one young man's reading level went up two grades after twenty-
seven days in "the slammer." This prompted one individual to
venture that if the judge had kept that kid six months, he'd either
be teaching school or practicing law. A national survey revealed
that nearly half of the juvenile judges believe that placing a
youngster in detention provides a means whereby the serious na-
ture of the juvenile justice system can be impressed. It is inter-
esting to note that only 28% of those in charge of detention
centers agree with the judges." Juvenile judges are not malicious
or even unfeeling in their dealings with children. On the con-
trary, the author is convinced that, in most instances, they do
what they think is best for the child.
However, the fact remains that many children are being emo-
tionally, physically, and legally abused as a result of the belief
that the court can operate as either a super-parent or as a social
shoplifting, see HIBBERT, THE ROOTS OF EVIL 62 (1963). The warning of The Lord
Chief Justice is interesting:
I trust your Lordships will pause before you assent to an experiment preg-
nant with danger to the security of property ... and before you repeal a
statute which has so long been held necessary for public security. I am
convinced, with the rest of the judges, that public expediency requires
there should be no offenders. Such will be the consequence of the repeal
of this statute that I am certain depredations to an unlimited extent would
immediately be committed .... My Lords if we suffer this Bill to pass, we
shall not know where we stand; we shall not know whether we are upon
our head or our feet .... Repeal this law and see the contrast-no man
can trust himself for an hour out of doors without the most alarming ap-
prehensions, that, on his return, every vestige of his property will be
swept off by the hardened robber.
10. A study of Michigan's juvenile justice services revealed:
A disturbing number of responses were concerned with increasing the pu-
nitive power of the court. These comments are somewhat difficult to un-
derstand in relation to the juvenile court philosophy or even modem
corrections theory and practice generally. A judge that tells an inter-
viewer he wants the power to sentence juveniles to jail terms does not ap-
pear to have a basic grasp of the juvenile court concept.
JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATES, MICHIGAN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICES 60 (1973). See
also M. RECTOR, PINS CASES: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL, NCCD 4 (1974), "At this
moment 66,000 boys and girls are confined in the country's training schools or
equivalent institutions. Depending on the state, from 45 to 55 percent of those
youngsters are labeled 'persons in need of supervision."' This attitude is appar-
ently shared by parents. See Lilly and Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force Pro-
mote Change, III CHANGE: A JUVENILE JUSTICE QUARTERLY (1979), "Unfortunately
for the youth, his stepfather was a friend of the deputy sheriff. In anger, the step-
father asked the deputy to 'lock him up to teach him a lesson.' Seven weeks later,
the child was still in jail."
11. See SILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 322.
agency.12
In the early days of the author's judicial career, he regularly
sent, (when space was available) status offenders to the same in-
stitutions as felony offenders. In the early 1970's, the author,
along with several other Michigan judges, placed children in a
program located outside the country. The concept of treatment
was culture shock. Supposedly, after a few weeks, the child
would become psychologically disoriented and thus become more
receptive to treatment.
However, the author now feels that while the court was helping
many deserving youngsters, court action simply was not neces-
sary. It appeared to the author that most of the children and their
parents were in court because the court either owned the services
or controlled access thereto. Regretably many of these children
had spent a few days in detention before appearing in court.
Because of the author's nine year judicial experience, he be-
came firmly convinced that status offense jurisdiction should be
abolished. The purpose of this article is to explain some of the
reasons behind this assertion after the author discusses the na-
ture of what constitutes a status offender.
A status offender is commonly defined as one whose acts are
proscribed solely because of his age.13 Runaways and school
truants account for the largest number of these youngsters.
The mere act of running away from home is insufficient to sus-
tain a guilty verdict, a fact often overlooked in many courts (as it
must be if the court is going to provide services). There must be
a further showing that the child left home without sufficient
cause.14 Such showing is simply not possible in the great major-
ity of cases. 15 Thus, it seems fair to conclude that many children
who run away from home are erroneously labeled as status of-
fenders.
The same argument can be made concerning the act of truancy.
It is reasonable to assume that some children fail to attend school
because their parents either refuse or neglect to send them. This
12. See WOODEN, supra note 7.
13. See National Council on CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, 21, 97 (1975).
Status offenses are acts committed by children (truancy, running away,
consensual sexual behavior, smoking, drinking, curfew violation, dis-
obeying authority, ungovernability, waywardness, etc.) which would not
be considered crimes if committed by adults but which subject children to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
14. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 712A.2(2) (A) (2). "Who has deserted his home
without sufficient cause. .. "
15. See Blua, Why Parents Kick Their Kids Out, PARENTS MAGAZINE, April,
1979, at 66, "'Throwaways' or 'push-outs'-30 to 60 percent of the total-are youths
who are told to leave home."
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reasoning promulgated the Michigan child attendance law di-
recting that parents who fail to send their children to school can
be found guilty of a misdemeanor.16 The author knows of no case
where the statute has been enforced.
It has also been asserted that many children labeled as status
offenders are actually delinquents, but that such behavior cannot
be proven. A child, like an adult, should account for what he or
she has done, not for what society thinks he or she may have
done. No one should be penalized for one act when the commu-
nity is really concerned about another. If an adult armed robber
is charged with a lesser crime, the law does not permit him to be
sentenced for armed robbery. In the juvenile system, no such dis-
tinction is made, and the runaway may be incarcerated for a
longer period of time than the robber.17
II. COURT JURISDICTION OVER STATUS OFFENDERS SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED
A. Juvenile Court Judges Do Not Have The Expertise To Make
The Decisions They Must Make
"Not every determination by state officers can be made most ef-
fectively by one of the procedural tools of judicial and administra-
tive decisionmaking."'18 It is a rare instance in which a status
offense case goes to trial. Of the thousands of such cases which
have been heard in the author's court, he knows of only one case
in which a trial was held. One judge, in referring to what he
termed the evidentary obviousness of such cases, stated that "[a]
trial serves little purpose."19 While the author strongly disagrees
with his statement, he feels that it accurately reflects the thinking
of many individuals within the juvenile justice system.
The juvenile judge is actually deciding whether the youngster
requires treatment, and if so, what type of treatment is most ap-
propriate, unless he merely rubber stamps that which has already
been decided. The author does not believe that the above state-
ments slight the many fine, hard-working juvenile court judges,
16. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 340.743 (1975 Rev.).
17. See INGRAM, supra note 1 at 27. "The average period for commitment of
juveniles to correctional institutions is 9.9 months. Those held for status offenses
remain an average of 4 to 5 months longer than children convicted of criminal of-
fenses."
18. Parham v. J.L. & J.R., 47 U.S.L.W. 4740, 4746 (1979).
19. See Arthur, supra note 8, at 640.
but that when taken as a group, they are almost totally unpre-
pared by education, training, and experience to deal with the fam-
ily dynamics presented by the typical status offense case.20
Normally, a juvenile court judge brings his legal training and his
experience as a child and a parent to his job. Inasmuch as it is
likely that neither the judge nor the judge's children have ever
come within the jurisdiction of a juvenile court, it is difficult to ap-
ply his or her experience as a parent or child to the cases that
come before his or her court.
The training of the staff of the court does not compensate for
the lack of expertise of the judge, since the staff work for, and
often retain their jobs at the pleasure of the juvenile court judge.
It is likely that these employees are influenced by the style,
whims and prejudices of the person who approves their
paychecks. Although the juvenile judge is influenced by the pro-
fessional advice of the court social worker, such advice may be
tailored to fit the judge who requested it.
B. Court Proceedings May Do More Harm Than Good2l
In the case of Parham v. J. L., the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle that "parents possess what a child lacks
in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions," 22 and the Court recognized that
"natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest
20. See JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATES FINAL REPORT 151:
The judges were asked to estimate the percent of their time which they
devoted to juvenile court matters, since it was known in advance that al-
most all of them would have some other judicial responsibility-or be only
part-time judges. Responses from 69 judges indicated that this group de-
voted only 54.3 percent of their time to juvenile work.
In the same report it is stated that the "judges were asked how much in-service
training they had obtained during the past year.... Fifty-seven of 71 interviewed
reported some training during the past year. The number of days totalled 545 for
an average of 9.56 days each in the last year." Id. at 152.
21. Haney & Gold, The Juvenile Delinquent Nobody Knows, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Sept. 1973, at 49.
And in spite of a vigorous and verbose legal machinery, catching a
delinquent does little to stop his or her illegal acts. To the contrary,
getting caught makes adolescents more likely to commit delinquent
acts .... In only 10 of the 35 pairs did the unapprehended control commit
more offenses. Whatever it is that the authorities do once they have
caught a youth, it seems to be worse than doing nothing at all, worse even
than never apprehending the offender. Getting caught encourages rather
than deters further delinquency.
Id. at 52. For an excellent discussion of the theory that involving the status of-
fender in the juvenile justice process produces the behavior it was intended to
prevent or deter. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, V A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1977).
22. Parham v. J.L., 47 U.S.L.W., at 4744.
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of their children."23 The Court went on to hold that, an adver-
sarial hearing was not required before a parent could have a men-
tally ill child admitted to a hospital for treatment, and that such a
hearing might actually be harmful:
Another problem with requiring a formalized fact finding hearing lies in
the danger it poses for significant intrusion into the parent-child relation-
ship. Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often will be at odds
with the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their child.
It is one thing to require a neutral physician to make a careful review of
the parents' decision in order to make sure it is proper from a medical
standpoint; it is a wholly different matter to employ an adversary contest
to ascertain whether the parents' motivation is consistent with the child's
interests.
Moreover, it will make his subsequent return home more difficult. These
unfortunate results are especially critical with an emotionally disturbed
child; they seem likely to occur in the context of an adversary hearing in
which the parents testify. A confrontation over such intimate family rela-
tionships would distress the normal adult parents and the impact on a dis-
turbed child almost certainly would be significantly greater.
24
The above rationale may have a stronger application in the typi-
cal status offense case. Usually the tension between parent and
child is very high with each of the two convinced of the other's
blame. The child, particularly if a runaway, is likely to be hostile
toward the parent because he or she will likely have undergone a
period of detention prior to the hearing. The parent, of course, is
convinced in many cases, that a period of detention is the appro-
priate sanction. Sometimes this is a temporal feeling, the product
of the parent's anger. The parent may later be thankful that the
judge did not accede to such wishes.
Generally what is needed here is a wise friend and counselor
rather than a judge. Obviously, the family is in need of services,
which the court, if functioning as required by the Gault deci-
sion,25 may not be able to provide.
To illustrate, consider the offense of running away. As noted
earlier, running away, of itself, is not sufficient to sustain a guilty
verdict for a status offense. The child must have run away with-
23. Id. at 4744.
24. Id. at 4746.
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court imposed the following require-
ments on delinquency adjudication:
First, adequate and timely notice of the charge must be given to the child
and his parents; Second, both child and parents must be advised of right
to counsel and that if they are unable to afford counsel, one will be ap-
pointed; and Third, that the privilege against self-incrimination applies,
and last, the child has the right to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him.
out good cause. In the author's experience, most runaways have
cause or feel their action is justified. As soon as the alleged of-
fender says, "Yes, I ran, but. . . ," the judge must halt the pro-
ceedings. The youngster is entitled to the services of an attorney
and the state must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the state fails to sustain its burden, the case is dismissed and a
troubled youngster may receive no help.
The United States Supreme Court in Parham points out an-
other shortcoming of the adversary process:
[T]he parens patriae interest in helping parents care for the mental
health of their children cannot be fulfilled if the parents are unwilling to
take advantage of the opportunities because the admission process is too
onerous, too embarassing or too contentious. It is surely not idle to specu-
late as to how many parents who believe they are acting in good faith
would forego state-provided hospital care if such care is contingent on
participation in an adversarial proceeding designed to probe their motives
and other private family matters in seeking the voluntary admission. 26
Just as aversion to or fear of the adversary proceeding may deter
parents, it may be more likely to deter young people. Again, it
surely is not idle to speculate as to the number of children who
stay on the run or perhaps who stay in abusive situations because
of fear of the court.
C. Courts Lack Resources To Deal With Status Offenders
There is a presumption in the law that most parents can and
will act in the best interests of their children. Admittedly, how-
ever, some do not. There is also general agreement that most par-
ents can manage their children. Admittedly, however, some can
not. In the case of the former, the child abuse and neglect laws
are adequate to assure the protection of children if suspected
cases are reported to appropriate authorities. It is with the latter
that this article will deal.
According to one writer, the courts are not seeking status of-
fense cases and are diverting more than half of their efforts and
funds to other programs. He asserts that the courts deal only
with those youngsters who need involuntary help.27
Ideally, the only time a child will appear in court is when the
parent wishes the child to receive services and the child has re-
fused. In this context, the court is being used as a last resort and
is placed in the position of providing services where educators,
psychologists, social workers, and other specialists have failed.
The options available to the courts are limited. The child can be
ordered to be good, can be ordered to cooperate with the special-
ists who have already failed, and can be warned of the conse-
26. Parham v. J.L., 47 U.S.L.W. at 4745.
27. See Arthur, supra note 8, at 632.
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quences of his failure to do so. The ultimate decision, of course,
is to incarcerate. Once this decision is made, the frustration of
trying to find an appropriate placement begins. The difficulty is
encountered where the juvenile offender population significantly
exceeds the resources available causing any success to be more
likely to be by accident than by design.
It would probably be safe to assume that the situation in Michi-
gan is typical of what might be found in other states. In Michigan,
as of 1977, the state had about seven hundred spaces in its train-
ing schools. The year before, 29,834 youngsters were arrested for
serious felony offenses. 28 It is suspected that the national picture
is not much brighter. In 1965, 93% of the country's juvenile courts
serving 44.3% of the population, had no place for detention other
than the county jail.29 Kenneth Wooden explains that at least
twenty-eight states send children to placement facilities all over
the country.30
Judge John P. Collins of the Juvenile Court Center in Tuscon,
Arizona remarked that "[tihe state reform schools could do a
creditable job if they only had to deal with the violent young-
ster."13 Many agree with this view but argue the solution is to in-
crease resources, not abolish court jurisdiction. However, in this
age of tax limitation movements, such thinking appears to be fan-
ciful. 32
The problem was recently stated by one of Michigan's leading
juvenile court judges:
We need at least 400 state training school spaces for Wayne County Juve-
nile Court alone, but I doubt the legislature will come up with more than
28. Ball, Training Schools Crowded, THE DETROIT NEWS, Sept., 1977.
29. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE; TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 37
(1967).
30. See WOODEN, supra note 7, at 182.
31. Proctor, Has the Time Come to Get Tough With Juvenile Criminals, PARADE
MAGAZINE, Nov. 14, 1976, at 22.
32. See RECTOR, PINS CASES: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL, NCCD 4 (1974), where
he states:
In not a single case is the cost of keeping a youngster confined less than
the cost of keeping him in a college in the state, room, board, and tuition
included, and in most cases, it costs quite a bit more than maintaining a
youth in the finest college in the state .... In fact, Dr. Rosemary Sarri,
Project Director for the National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, has
pointed out that there is at least one juvenile institutional program which
costs an astonishing $36,000 per child. But irrespective of the cost, the
training school cannot cure the status offender's problems. These are in
the home, the school, and the community at large.
200 units for the entire state. [The state is] substituting hope for common
sense to think Michigan is going to provide sufficient institutional space
for case hardened juveniles before the year 2000. 3 3
It becomes readily apparent that the promise of help by the
courts is more myth than reality and has done much to under-
mine confidence in the court.
Perhaps more significantly, however, is the fact that scarce re-
sources are being used to incarcerate status offenders to the ex-
clusion of serious felons.34 This is undoubtedly a contributing
factor to the court's failure to effectively deal with serious juve-
nile crime.
D. Court Jurisdiction Impedes The Use Of Existing Community-
Based Resources And Slows The Development Of New
Ones
There are many fine community-based resources such as com-
munity mental health clinics, runaway houses, hotlines, and drop-
in centers capable of dealing very effectively with the problems
presented by the status offender. While the evidence indicates
that the courts are now diverting many status, offenders to such
programs in addition to developing diversionary programs of their
own,35 there is strong evidence these programs are not being fully
utilized.
Unlike the juvenile courts, private agencies are able to restrict
their caseloads and often will accept only those cases which seem
to offer a good prospect for their services. There is no pressure on
the agencies to act otherwise because it is commonly known that
the juvenile court must accept all cases presented to it.
Many of the referring agencies are simply reluctant to use serv-
ices outside the court. Generally, this is either because they are
ignorant of other available services or because all they really
want is a few days of detention for the youngster.
A case in point involves the author's own county. In 1977, a new
voluntary program called Runaway Emergency Action Center
Hotline (REACH) was developed outside the jurisdiction of the
court to provide voluntary services to runaways, including out of
home placement up to fourteen days. The success of this pro-
gram drastically reduced the number of runaway children who
came to court. But still many of the police agencies, despite the
best efforts of the court and juvenile service agencies, were reluc-
tant to use the program and the court continued to supply about
40% of the REACH referrals.
33. See Ball, supra note 28.
34. See SMBERMAN, supra note 3, at 347.
35. See Arthur, supra note 8, at 632.
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Finally, came the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.
This case involved a young man who, to paraphrase the police re-
port, was a male black, 6' 2" tall, 195 lbs., and apparently a good
student. The problem revolved around continued social security
funding. His mother told him he could live with some friends, but
when she found out that she could no longer draw social security
on him, she asked him to come home and he refused. The mother
proceeded to file a runaway complaint with the police.
Acting upon the complaint, the young man was arrested at 11:00
a.m. at the high school which he attended and was taken to police
headquarters where he was booked. He was held until 2:00 p.m.
for a hearing before a juvenile court referee.
In the wake of this case, a policy was immediately implemented
prohibiting the detention of status offenders. This policy gener-
ated a fair amount of criticism and concern but it also produced
some dramatic results.
In the nine months preceding the "no detention" policy, 541
runaways were referred to court. Of this number, about 273 had
been detained.3 6 In the twelve months following the policy, the
number of runaway youngsters referred to court dropped to 153,
and the number detained dropped to nineteen.37 Court referrals
now comprise only about 10% of the REACH caseload.
At present, the only time a runaway comes to court is when
REACH cannot solve the problem within the framework of its
time and financial constraints. The dire prediction regarding the
consequences of implementing such a program have not occurred.
There is no evidence that children run away more frequently than
before. In fact, the largest police agency in the county made 39%
fewer arrests in the first three months of 1979 than in the first
three months of 1975.38 Nor does it appear that the needs of chil-
dren are not being met. Moreover, most, if not all, of the police
agencies within the county approve of the program.
The beneficial effects are obvious. Children are being spared
the humiliation and degradation of being locked up where author-
36. During the years proceeding the initiation of REACH, the number of de-
tentions was significantly higher- 773 in 1973, 621 in 1975, and 579 in 1976.
37. The only way I can account for the fact that 19 runaways were detained
despite the "no detention" policy is that such occurred because of the confusion
attendant to any new program.
38. Report on the REACH Program in Genesee County, Michigan (1979) (on
file in the Genesee County Probate Court).
ities exercise what amounts to good judgment. The court and po-
lice are freeing considerable time and resources to deal with
other, more serious, juvenile offenders.
If such a program will work for the runaway, undoubtedly the
most confounding of the status offender cases, then similar pro-
grams could be developed for other troubled children. To that
end, the necessary course of action would be for the legislatures
of this country to remove the authority of juvenile courts over
these children.
III. CONCLUSION
The author has no doubt that most who favor retention of juris-
diction over status offenders do so because they sincerely believe
that many children are being helped who otherwise would not be.
In the alternative, it may be asserted that, in their zeal to help
they have lost sight of the court's enormous power to harm, of the
great trauma a young person suffers when locked in an institution
or a jail cell and of the bitterness generated when the realization
sets in that he received the same or greater punishment than the
burglar or robber.39
Many acknowledge that a denial of due process may occur and
that some children are abused; but they argue for reform of juris-
diction, not for abolition of it. Their hope for the future ignores
the past. Twelve years ago, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the condition of being a child did not justify the
kangeroo court and instructed juvenile courts to henceforth ob-
serve due process principles. 40 In many cases this mandate has
been disobeyed. It is time that the juvenile justice system dis-
closed to the public its inability to deal effectively with both the
serious felony offenders and the many problems simultaneously
presented by status offense cases.
The entire concept of a special court for children is in serious
condition and, unless drastic measures are taken, it is likely to
worsen. It if is to survive, insistence must be made upon limiting
the role of the court to what it does best; fact finding and adjudi-
cating.4 1 We should acknowledge that the juvenile court judges
39. WHEELER AND COTTREL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-IT'S PREVENTION AND
CONTROL 33 (1966) where they state:
Thus a principal current concern in the juvenile court field has to do with
the provision of justice and fairness to juveniles .... Unless appropriate
due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law
may not feel he is being fairly treated and may therefore resist the reha-
bilitative efforts of court personnel.
40. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. In addition to the above mentioned responsibilities some juvenile judges
[Vol. 7: 923, 1980] Status Offenders
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
often do not have the education and training to identify troubled
children and to determine their needs. It should be admitted that
they cannot educate children or make them obedient and more
likely to stay at home. These are the jobs of parents, schools, and
churches.
The world will not come to an end nor will the country fall if
juvenile court jurisdiction over the status offender is abrogated.
Reform is seldom as bad as predicted. Perhaps then the original
purpose of the juvenile court, that of ending the abuse and brutal-
ization of children and stemming the rising tide of juvenile crime,
will once again have the chance of becoming reality.
are thrust into the role of program administrator. See JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATES,
FINAL REPORT, 12 (1974),
The judiciary in Michigan is extensively involved in the direct administra-
tion of juvenile court services and child care programs. As such, juvenile
probate judges in Michigan are functioning in both the judicial and execu-
tive branches of government. A Michigan juvenile court judge, under
present arrangements, both hears individual cases and is responsible for
administering child care programs involving the care of children placed in
them as a direct result of his own order. This presents both a potential
and real conflict of interest in the performance of his dual responsibilities
as a judge and as a program administrator.

